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Abstract—This study points out a semi-quantum protocol for private comparison using 
Bell states (SQPC) suffering from the double C-NOT attack and the malicious agent 
attack. The attacker can easily obtain information through these attacks. An improved 
protocol is proposed, which can effectively resist both of these attacks. 
 




In 2020, Jiang proposed a series of semi-quantum protocols for private comparison 
on Bell states (SQPC) [1]. Though there are two SQPC protocols proposed in this paper, 
we focus on the first protocol in Jiang’s manuscript. The purpose of Jiang’s first SQPC 
protocol is to let a Third Party (TP) compares the secrets of two participants, Alice and 
Bob, to be identical or not without leaking secrets to TP or anyone who is not the secret 
holder.  
In this protocol, there are two participants, Alice and Bob, and a semi-honest TP. 
Both Alice and Bob are the classical users who can only perform the following two 
2 
 
operations. (1) Reflection: simply reflect the receiving qubits. (2) Preparing qubits: 
prepare the qubits in the classical basis {|0⟩, |1⟩}. The definition of semi-honest TP is 
adapted from Yang et al. [2], which defines a semi-honest TP may misbehave on its 
own, but not allowed to conspire with other participants in the protocol. It is assumed 
that the quantum channel is ideal (i.e., non-lossy and noiseless). 
However, this kind of semi-quantum protocol is usually vulnerable to the double 
C-NOT attack, and we point out that Jiang’s SQPC suffers the same issue, which causes 
the information leaking. Also, we mention a malicious agent attack where one 
participant can obtain the other participant’s secrets by simply measuring on target 
qubits. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the first SQPC 
protocol in Jiang’s manuscript. Section 3 points out the security issues in this protocol, 
and we propose some solutions to solve these problems. Finally, Section 4 will give a 
conclusion about this paper. 
2. Review of Jiang’s SQPC Protocol 
Preliminary: There is a pre-shared key of length L, composed of {0,1}, shared between 
Alice and Bob, namely KAB. Alice (Bob) generates a random binary number of length 
L, namely RA (RB). The secret of length L holds by Alice (Bob) is denoted as SecretA 




















We briefly review the first SQPC protocol proposed in Jiang’s manuscript. The 
protocol is described step-by-step in the following: 
Step 1 TP prepares 2L EPR pairs in four Bell states mentioned in Eq. (1) 
randomly. Then he/she divides each EPR pair into two quantum sequences 
SA and SB. SA comprises one particle from each EPR pair, while SB 
comprises another one. Both quantum sequences SA and SB will be sent to 
Alice and Bob, respectively. 
Step 2 Alice (Bob) prepares a message MA (MB), which is denoted by:  
MA(B) = SecretA(B) ⊕RA(B) ⊕KAB . 
Upon receiving SA (SB) sent by TP, each of them will choose two modes 
called CTRL mode or SIFT mode randomly to operate. Specifically, in 
CTRL mode, the participant should reflect the receiving particle directly. 
While in SIFT mode, the participant should discard the receiving particle, 
then prepare a qubit according to Mi  ( i ∈ {A, B} ) instead. For more 
information, if the bit going to be encoded is 0 (1), the corresponding qubit 
should be prepared in |0⟩  (|1⟩)  state. After finishing the chosen 
operation, the participants send back these (modified) qubits to TP. 
Step 3 Upon receiving all the qubits sent from Alice and Bob, TP informs these 
participants about its receipt. Then, both participants declare about what 
mode (CTRL or SIFT) they chose on each particle. 
Step 4 Depends on what mode the participants chose on each particle, TP 
performs a different operation.  
(a) If both Alice and Bob chose CTRL mode, TP will perform a Bell 
measurement. In expectation, TP should get the same result as what 
it prepared; otherwise, there are eavesdroppers. 
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(b) If any of them chose SIFT mode, TP will perform single-particle 
measurement on the SIFT one to get MA or MB. 
 
Step 5 TP checks the error rate in case (a) given in Step 4, if the value higher than 
threshold, this session will be aborted; otherwise, they will proceed to the 
next step. 
Step 6 If the eavesdropper checking procedure succeeds, Alice and Bob publish 
RA and RB respectively. Then, TP computes MT = MA ⊕MB ⊕RA ⊕
RB  bit-by-bit. For each bit, if the result bit is ‘0’, which means the 
corresponding bits in both secrets are identical, TP writes down the result, 
and then proceeds to next bit; otherwise, if the result bit is ‘1’, TP finds out 
the secrets are different and ends the procedure immediately. If the 
computing procedure done and MT comprises only ‘0’, it indicates that 
both secrets are identical. Finally, TP tells Alice and Bob the comparison 
result. 
3. Security Issues on Jiang’s First SQPC Protocol 
In a mock protocol, there are two users, namely Alice and Bob, respectively. Alice 
sends a number of qubits to Bob. And after Bob performed some operations on qubits, 
he sends those qubits, whether modified or not, back to Alice. Notice that all the qubits 
during the process should only be in the classical basis. A typical double C-NOT attack 
usually follows the template that is described as follows. The eavesdropper Eve (or a 
semi-honest TP) prepares a |0⟩ state as the target qubit in following C-NOT attack. 
When the attack beginning, she performs first C-NOT on the qubits that Alice first sent 
to Bob, then performs second C-NOT on the returning qubits. To obtain the information, 
Eve just simply measures the qubits she holds, and then compares to the original state 
|0⟩ . What’s more, the qubit being attacked will remain the expected state, so the 





3.1 Double C-NOT attack on Jiang’s first SQPC protocols 
Jiang’s first SQPC protocol is exactly suffering from the double C-NOT attack. 
We take TP and Alice for example. In this example, without loss of generality, the Bell 
states TP preparing are all in |𝜑+⟩ state. While TP sends the particle to Alice, the 




(|0𝐴0𝐸0𝐵⟩ + |1𝐴1𝐸1𝐵⟩) 
(2) 
The subscripts of the states in Eq. (2) represent the one who holds the qubit. ‘A’ 
indicates Alice, ‘B’ indicates Bob, and ‘E’ indicates the attacker. 
Then, the attacker performs another C-NOT attack while Alice is sending her qubit 
back to TP. Depends on the different modes Alice performed, there will be two 
situations occurring.  
If Alice performs CTRL mode, that is, simply reflects the qubits back to TP. The 
states after the attack are shown in Eq. (3). 
1
√2
(|0𝐴0𝐵⟩ + |1𝐴1𝐵⟩) (3) 
Both qubits of Alice and Bob remain unchanged, which means the attack still 
keeps silent. While the qubits that the attacker holds will remain in |0⟩ state. 
If Alice performs SIFT mode, that Alice discards the received qubit, both the 
attacker and Bob’s qubit will become |𝜑+⟩ state that is shown in Eq. (4). 
1
√2
(|0𝐸0𝐵⟩ + |1𝐸1𝐵⟩) (4) 






(|0𝐴0𝐸0𝐵⟩ + |0𝐴1𝐸1𝐵⟩) 
(5) 
On the other hand, if Alice sends back a |1⟩ state, after the second C-NOT attack, these 
states will become: 
1
√2
(|1𝐴1𝐸0𝐵⟩ + |1𝐴0𝐸1𝐵⟩) 
(6) 
But, no matter what situation occurred, the attacker always has a 50% of chances 
to get |1⟩ state as the measurement outcome. With this outcome, the attacker can 
ensure this qubit must operate under SIFT mode. Then, she can perform Z-basis 
measurement on the attacked qubit to get MA. With MA, the attacker can strike the 
known-plaintext attack and then obtain the pre-shared key KAB successfully while 
remaining in silent. 
3.2 Malicious agent attack on Jiang’s first SQPC protocols 
 In the previous section, we have mentioned that after Alice and Bob sent back their 
qubits, what operations will TP take according to their chosen modes in Step 4. As we 
can see, no matter who decides to perform SIFT mode, TP cannot check the correctness 
about this bit by Bell measurement. As the consequences, if one of the participants, for 
example, Bob, decides to steal Alice’s secret, he can easily achieve it by simply 
measuring the qubits Alice sending back corresponding to the bits when he performs 
SIFT mode. Since the qubits produced by Alice are in the classical basis, he can prepare 
the same states of qubits and can send these to TP, which makes the attack not being 
detected, and Bob can obtain a fraction of Alice’s secret. 
Here we conclude how this protocol vulnerable to these attacks. Owing to the 
action about discarding qubits in Step 2, there will have a certain possibility that Eve 
can get an indicative measurement outcome in the double C-NOT attack. Both 
participants use the classical basis for all returned qubits, including the encoded qubits, 




3.3 Solutions to solve the security issues on Jiang’s first SQPC protocols 
Here we suggest an improved protocol to solve these security issues. In general, 
we change the quantum source from Bell states to single photons, alongside the new 
SIFT mode which uses measure-resend instead of discard-and-generate. Also, in order 
to check the integrity of these messages, we double the length of the encoded message, 
of which half will be used to fulfill this target. The detail is in the following. 
First of all, as we mentioned before, the improved protocol will use single photons 
as the quantum source. More specifically, X-basis photons are prepared in random 
states {|+⟩, |−⟩ }, the number of initial photons is 8L, where each participant will 
receive a half.  
In Step 2, participants perform measure-resend with the classical basis in improved 
SIFT mode. The photons they are going to resend will be used to be Ri but not encoded 
with Mi (i ∈ {A, B}). This means Ri increases from L to 2L.  
In Step 4, for the situation that any participants chose CTRL mode on the 
corresponding qubits, TP performs X-basis measurement on these qubits to check if the 
states identical to the initial ones. If not, this session will be aborted; otherwise, they 
will proceed to the next step. 
Here we insert an additional checking procedure. Both participants choose about 
half of Ri and publish their position and measurement results for TP checks if there 
exists a malicious agent trying to strike the blocking attack on the opposite side. The 
blocking attack, in detail, is a malicious agent may perform X-basis measurement on 
all the returned qubits from the attacked side, resulting in receiving the wrong 
information by TP while he/she is not noticing the strikes and the loss of the integrity. 
In Step 6, both participants publish Mi instead of Ri. The remaining procedure is 
identical to the original. 
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This improved protocol, however, heavies the users’ burden by adding the 








This paper points out a double C-NOT attack and a malicious agent attack on 
Jiang’s first SQPC protocol. By using the double C-NOT attack, an eavesdropper Eve 
can steal 50% of participants' secrets while undetected. And for the malicious agent 
attack, the agent who plans to steal another agent’s secret can actually steal a portion 
of secrets by simply measuring the qubits the attacked one sends back corresponding to 
the bits he/she performs SIFT mode. To solve these security issues, we suggest an 
improved protocol. By using single photons and measure-resend, although this protocol 
will heavy users’ burden and decrease the qubit efficiency by half, it can avoid these 
attacks effectively and secure the information without using Bell states. Our improved 
protocol is also lighter than Jiang’s second SQPC protocol, which is secure but the 
participants need to perform reorder. 
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